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In C h a n g e  in V ie w 1  G ilbert H arm an produces argum ents o f the follow ing 
pattern: O f tw o com peting m ethods o f be lie f revision, one is to o  h a r d ; the other 
m ust therefore be the rational m ethod. I w ill call argum ents o f this form  
h a r d n e s s  a r g u m e n ts . H ardness argum ents are not, o f course, peculiar to 
H arm an; and considerations o f this k ind have recently  becom e m ore popular in  
the ph ilosophical literature.2 B ut H arm an 's hardness argum ents prov ide an 
object lesson in  the pitfalls o f deploying such considerations.
I w ill first exam ine tw o o f H arm an's hardness argum ents, and argue that neither 
is sound.3 E xam ining these argum ents w ill give us a close look  at how  hardness 
argum ents are supposed to w ork; they w ill also show  how  hardness argum ents 
are harder to get o ff the ground than m ight have been supposed. I w ill then 
consider w hether this form  o f argum ent is valid. A fter arguing that it is not, I 
w ill consider w hat is requ ired  i f  one is to deploy hardness argum ents 
nonetheless. F inally, I w ill raise the question  o f w hether argum ents o f this form  
require presuppositions that prove incoherent. I w ill suggest that hardness 
argum ents are often m isconceived, in  that they ask  a question  that m akes sense 
w hen one is d e s ig n in g  hardw are, bu t no t w hen one is  the hardw are.
B ut before doing all these things, let m e address a necessary  prelim inary: w hat 
"hard" m eans here. A  problem  is e a s y  i f  you can do it in  a reasonable  am ount 
o f tim e and w ith a reasonable am ount o f effort, w ithout overtaxing your 
m em ory, and so on.4 A  problem  is h a r d  i f  it's not easy; it's h a r d  in p r a c t i c e  but 
not in p r in c ip le  i f  you could  solve the p roblem  on a bigger, faster com puter that
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you could buy. (I m ean hardness in  p ractice to be sensitive to w hat resources 
are actually  available to you w hen you 're trying to solve the problem ; one 
m ight say im p r a c tic a l  f o r  th e  p r o b le m  s o lv e r  instead.) A  problem  is h a r d  in  
p r in c ip le  i f  buying a bigger, faster com puter w ouldn 't help. (For instance, if  
buying a com puter as big as the know n universe, w ith  as m any circuits as there 
are estim ated  to be  particles in  the universe, and running it from  the B ig B ang 
until the heat death o f the universe w ouldn 't solve the p roblem  -- then it's hard  
in  principle.) W hile  for presen t philosophical purposes the precise location of 
the border betw een hard  in  p rincip le  and hard  only in  practice m ay be 
negotiable, a ru le  o f thum b in  the C om puter Science com m unity  is that 
problem s solvable using com putational resources (i.e., tim e, space, and num ber 
o f processors) that are polynom ial in  the size o f the input are considered not 
hard  in  principle; problem s that aren't, are hard  in  princip le.5 H ere I'm  going to 
treat this ru le o f thum b as delineating, at least roughly, this distinction.
1
H arm an's first hardness argum ent is that be lie f rev ision  should not w ork  by 
m odifying probabilities that are explicitly  assigned to all o f one's beliefs.6 The 
reason  is that this procedure is too hard, because updating the probabilities o f 
one's beliefs using conditionalization w ould  be hard  in  principle. H arm an relies 
on Jeffrey 's treatm ent, w hich provides an equation for assessing the im pact o f 
new  evidence on a proposition  A.7 W hat is im portan t for present purposes is 
that if  one's system  o f beliefs has n  elem ents, the equation suggests that in 
order to com pute the new  probability  o f A, one m ust do 2 n additions.
H arm an concludes that " [i]f  one is to be prepared  for various possib le 
conditionalizations, then for every proposition... one w ants to update, one m ust 
have already assigned probabilities to various conjunctions o f [it]  together w ith 
one or m ore o f the possib le ev idence propositions... this leads to a 
com binatorial exp losion ...” (p. 25). T hat is, in  order to update the probability  o f 
A , you  w ould  need  to know  the probabilities o f all 2 n conjunctions, and the 
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requ ire  exponential m em ory. D oing the num ber o f calculations suggested by 
Jeffrey 's equation w ould  also take exponential tim e. B elief rev ision  o f this kind 
is therefore hard  in  principle.
N ow  it's a ru le  o f thum b in  com puter science, or at any ra te , in  the A I part o f it, 
that the general case o f any interesting problem  is intractable. B ut it doesn 't 
follow  from  this that solving interesting problem s is im possible. T he reason  is 
that the general case includes the w orst case; bu t it's often unnecessary  to deal 
w ith the w orst case. B y m aking reasonable assum ptions, it's often possib le to 
find  an algorithm  that w ill turn the trick  for large classes o f interesting cases. In 
particu lar, there's no reason  to th ink  that it's necessary  to m aintain  the 
probabilities o f 2 n conjunctions in  this w ay in  order to do a reasonable  jo b  o f 
m aintaining a b e lie f system  using  probabilities.8
T he question o f how  best to render problem s like this com putationally  tractable 
is an active area o f research ; to illustrate  the po in t I'll use one o f the m ost 
prom inent approaches, B ayesian  netw orks.9 B ayesian  netw orks are directed 
acyclic graphs (D A G s) w hose nodes represen t propositions or beliefs, and 
w hose arcs represen t the (typically  causal) dependence o f a p roposition  or 
b e lie f on its parents.10 A ssociated  w ith  each node is a 'link m atrix ' g iving the 
conditional probabilities o f the node for the possib le  conjunctions o f its 
parents; this table w ill be sm all p rovided  that the num ber o f parents is small.
B ayesian netw orks are a w ay to m odel local dependencies -- the fact that, 
typically , m ost o f the beliefs one has are not d irectly  re levan t to a particular, 
given belief: i f  relevant at all, they are relevan t only th ro u g h  their m aking m ore 
or less likely som e other proposition, w hose tru th  is  d irectly  relevan t to that o f 
the b e lie f in  question. For exam ple, m y beliefs about the corner grocery store 
are re levan t to m y beliefs about E ast A sian politics only indirectly: by  w ay of 
the b e lie f that the new spaper I buy from  them  is an authentic copy o f T h e N e w  
Y o rk  T im e s , and not a forgery  o f som e kind. I f  the probability  o f this b e lie f is 
fixed, I need  no longer consider the bearing o f the probabilities o f m y other 













U n i v e r s i t y  o f  U t a h  I n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e p o s i t o r y
A u t h o r  M a n u s c r i p t
W hich, and how  m any, com putations one m ust perform  (and w hich 
probabilities one m ust already know ) is a m atter o f the structure o f the graph. 
T he structure o f the graph represents the relevance o f m y beliefs to each other. 
A  com pletely  connected graph w ould  represent a system  o f beliefs all o f w hich 
w ere directly  re levan t to every other b e lie f in  the system ; H arm an w ould  be 
right in  th inking o f a system  o f beliefs like this that it w ould  be  im practical to 
m aintain  by conditionalizing probabilities.11 B ut our system s o f b e lie f are not 
usually  like this; and w hen they are not, their structural features can be 
exploited  to m ake updating them  com putationally  tractable. For exam ple, if  a 
B ayesian  netw ork  is singly-connected  (i.e., tree-structured), then it can be 
updated  to accom m odate the im pact o f new  evidence in  tim e proportional to 
the longest path  in  the netw ork; this is q u ite  tractable.12
H arm an, then, argues that be lie f rev ision  cannot involve updating probabilities 
(and that belief, therefore, cannot be a m atter o f  degree bu t m ust be all or 
nothing) on the grounds that such be lie f rev ision  w ould  be too hard, because 
hard  in  principle. B ut the argum ent is unsound, because b e lie f rev ision  using 
probabilities need  no t be hard  in  principle. In  m any cases o f in terest there are 
likely to be tractable algorithm s that w ill allow  one to revise one's beliefs using 
probabilities.13
2
A fter considering and rejecting probability-subscrip ted  beliefs, H arm an 
invokes another hardness argum ent to choose betw een C o h e r e n c e  T h e o r y  and 
F o u n d a tio n s  T h e o ry . Foundations Theory  holds that the justifica tion  for 
holding a be lie f is a m atter o f the beliefs that support it, no t o f  the fact that one 
does have that belief. C oherence Theory, on the other hand, holds that the m ere 
fact that one has a b e lie f is (som e) justifica tion  for continuing to have it; and 
that be lie f rev ision  is to be undertaken w hen it w ould  lead  to an increm ent in 
coherence that is w orth  the cost o f m aking the change. 14
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Foundations Theory w ould be too hard. The reason  is that "[t]here is a lim it to 
w hat one can rem em ber, a lim it to w hat one can retrieve. It is im portan t to save 
room  fo r im portan t things and  not clu tter one's m ind w ith a lo t of unim portant 
m atters" (pp. 42f). S ince the Foundations Theory requires one to rem em ber the 
reasons for acquiring each o f one's beliefs, it requires that one clutter one's 
m ind w ith  "an incredib le num ber o f m ostly  perceptual original prem ises, along 
w ith m any, m any in term ediate steps w hich one does not w ant and has little 
need  to rem em ber" (p. 43). B ecause be lie f rev ision  that accords w ith  the 
Foundations Theory is too hard, the C oherence Theory is to  be  p referred  to  it.
N ow  w hile keeping track  of things like this is hard  (for us), it is not hard  in  
princip le.15 It is easy to program  a com puter to keep track  o f the reasons that 
supported its inferences and to engage in  foundationalist b e lie f rev ision16 
(w hen you delete a belief, follow  the  pointers dow n to beliefs it supported and, 
if  they don’t have other, independent support, delete them  too).17 A gain, w e 
cannot rem em ber all the sensory ev idence that supports our beliefs, and current 
com puters w ould  be hard-pressed  to do so as w ell; bu t it is very  likely  that in  a 
few  years this w on’t be a p roblem  for the com puters. So w hile belief revision 
that conform s to  Foundations Theory is hard  in  p ractice (for m ost hum an 
beings, at any rate), it is not hard  in  principle.
It follow s that H arm an’s second hardness argum ent doesn’t w ork. That is 
because H arm an’s argum ent derives its preference for C oherence T heory  over 
Foundations Theory from  its view  that foundationalist be lie f rev ision  is h a r d e r  
than coherentist be lie f revision. B ut this is a m istake. For (I w ill now  argue) 
coherentist be lie f rev ision  is (probably) hard  in  principle, w hich m akes it 
harder than foundationalist belief revision, w hich is only hard  in  practice.
The "probably" inserted  in  the last sentence is due in  part to H arm an’s failure to 
say ju s t w hat coherence is. H e says that "[f]or present purposes, I do no t need 
to be  too specific as to exactly  w hat coherence involves, except to say it 
includes not only consistency but also a netw ork  of relations am ong one’s 
beliefs, especially  relations o f im plication  and explanation" (p. 32).18 Since 
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w ill have to m ake an educated  guess, leaving open the possib ility  that w e have 
m istaken  his in ten tions.19
C oherence Theory does tell us the follow ing. W hen faced  w ith  the possibility  
o f  revising our beliefs, w e should com pare our unrevised  system  o f beliefs to 
our system  w ith  the proposed  rev ision  (and m aybe to the system  w ith  other 
revisions). W e are to determ ine w hich o f the tw o (or m ore) is m ore coherent, 
and  roughly  how  m uch m ore coherent it is. O n the basis o f a further 
com parison o f the gain in  coherence w ith  the size o f the p roposed  revision, w e 
are to choose w hether to m ake the revision. T he rev ision  is to be  m ade if  the 
gain in  coherence is w orth  a m odification  o f that size.20 For our purposes, it 
w ill suffice to note that this outline o f a procedure for be lie f rev ision  requires 
one to determ ine and com pare the coherence o f system s o f belief.
N ow  H arm an has no t to ld  us exactly  w hat coherence is, bu t i f  w e represen t a 
system  o f beliefs as a graph w hose nodes are beliefs and w hose arcs are the 
"relations am ong [them], especially  relations o f im plication  and exp lanation”, 
w e shall not be straying too far from  H arm an’s ow n ta lk  o f a "netw ork” (p. 
32).21 C oherence w ill then be  at least in  part a m atter o f graph-theoretic 
properties o f the graph, and determ ining the coherence o f a system  o f beliefs 
w ill be tan tam ount to determ ining, am ong other things, those properties o f the 
graph. Therefore, the difficulty  o f the task  posed  by  C oherence Theory  w ill be 
at least as great as the difficulty  o f determ ining the relevan t graph-theoretic 
properties.
Just how  hard  that w ill be w ill depend on w hat the p roperty  in  question is, bu t I 
suggest that for p lausib le candidates for the relevan t property, the p roblem  w ill 
be  hard  in  principle.
A s H arm an says, ”[i]f one’s beliefs are coherent, they are m utually  
supporting” (33). This suggests that a graph-theoretic characterization of 
coherence w ill involve solving the follow ing problem . C onsider a path  betw een 
nodes A  and B  in  a graph. Every link  in  the path  has som e probability  o f 
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true, yet D  be false, w ith som e probability  p .  N ow  w e can com pute the 
reliab ility  o f the path  easily  enough. B ut w e should be in terested  in  the general 
support that A  p rovides B , through a l l  paths; the presum ption  is that a belief 
system  in  w hich  beliefs give each other m uch re liab le  support is m ore coherent 
than one in  w hich they support each other less. T he problem  o f calculating this 
general support is know n as N e tw o r k  R e l ia b i l i ty .  This p roblem  is v e r y  hard: it 
is in  fact # P -h a rd .^  If  this is w hat coherence involves, then coherentist belief 
rev ision  is m uch harder than foundationalist be lie f rev ision .23
It seem s very likely  that any p lausib le notion o f coherence w ill in v o lv e , e.g., 
N etw ork  R eliability , or som e variation on it. W e m ay tentatively  conclude that 
determ ining the coherence o f a system  o f beliefs is likely  to be  hard  in 
principle. If  it is hard  in  principle, then coherentist b e lie f rev ision  is harder than 
foundationalist be lie f revision, w hich is only hard  in  practice. A nd if  this is the 
case, then H arm an’s second hardness argum ent is unsound, since its m ost 
im portan t p rem ise is that coherentist b e lie f rev ision  is easier than 
foundationalist be lie f revision.
If  C oherence Theory requires determ ining the degree o f coherence o f a graph, 
it is not viable, because doing this is likely  to be  too hard. O ne possib le w ay out 
o f this difficulty  m ight be to avoid having to determ ine the coherence o f graphs 
in  the first place, by  finding a sim ple, local operation to perform  on a graph that 
can be proved  to increase coherence. O ne could  then com ply w ith  the dictates 
o f C oherence Theory  m erely  by  applying the operation. B ut this suggestion 
isn ’t very prom ising. If  one w ere to m odel the acquisition o f beliefs by 
constructing a graph using  som e inductive procedure that p reserved som e (very 
artificial) p roperty  at each step o f the w ay, it m ight be possib le to prove 
(inductively) that perform ing the local operation w ould  increase coherence. B ut 
real system s o f beliefs are unlikely  to have such carefu lly-constructed  and 
alm ost certainly  fragile  properties. A n inductive p ro o f o f this k ind  is extrem ely 
unlikely  for anything that realistically  m odels actual system s o f belief. 
C oherence is a global property, and the effects o f  a local operation on 
coherence w ill depend on features o f d istan t parts o f  the graph. I f  the graph has 
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telling w hat these m ight be. If one’s system  of beliefs has evolved m essily, then 
applying a local operation could, for all one know s, d e c r e a s e  the coherence of 
that system .24
M ore generally, a com putationally  tractable technique for determ ining the 
coherence of a system  of beliefs represen ted  by a graph can succeed only by  
exploiting structural features that not all graphs have. In  order to m ake it 
p lausib le that there  are such com putationally  tractab le techniques, it w ould  be 
necessary  to iden tify  the structural features that can be  so exploited. H arm an 
has not suggested w hat those features m ight be, nor has he given us reason  to 
th ink  that naturally  occurring system s of beliefs have them .
H arm an’s rejection  of Foundations Theory in  favor of C oherence Theory on the 
basis of the greater difficulty  of conform ing to the form er is, at best, prem ature. 
If anything, it seem s that on a p lausib le construal of coherence, C oherence 
T heory  w ill turn  out to be m u c h  harder than Foundations Theory: that, un like 
Foundations Theory, it w ill turn out to be hard  in  principle. N ow  since H arm an 
has not given us a precise specification of coherence, it m ay be that he (or 
som eone else) could  produce a defin ition of coherence that w ould  be  both  a 
p lausib le rendering of w hat is m eant by  coherence of belief system s and also 
com putationally  tractable. B ut I do not expect that producing a specification of 
coherence that m eets both  of these conditions w ill be a triv ial m atter (in fact, I 
suspect it to be im possib le); I th ink  that H arm an’s second hardness argum ent 
should  be considered  unsound pending such a specification.
T here is a m oral to be draw n here. H ardness argum ents p roceed from  from  
prem ises o f the form , ’M ethod M  is too h ard ’ (or, ’M ethod  M j  is harder than
M 2 '). B ut prem ises like these are harder to com e by than they m ight seem.
Problem s can turn  out to be p ragm atically  easier than they had  seem ed: 
approxim ations m ay be available, or the w orst case m ay not prove to be the 
norm al case. It is very difficult to  show  that acceptable approxim ations to  a 
precise  p roblem  solution are not available, if  only because ’approxim ation’ is 
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approxim ating algorithm  m ight arrive at a correct answ er m ost o f the tim e, or 
in  m ost o f the cases that are in  p ractice likely  to arise, or it m ight arrive at an 
answ er close enough to the precise value to be usable. W hat w ould  serve as an 
adequate approxim ation w ill depend on the purposes for w hich it is required. 
M any very  d isparate techniques m ay count as acceptable approxim ations to a 
g iven technique. M oreover, problem s can, on closer consideration, turn  out to 
be  harder than they had  seem ed; the com parative judgm ents needed for a 
hardness argum ent to get o ff the ground w ill often prove m istaken. I f  H arm an’s 
experience is any indication, sound hardness argum ents are going to be hard  to 
com e by.
3
I have argued that the tw o hardness argum ents that H arm an presents are (very 
probably) unsound; and that this is ind icative o f a general p roblem  in 
constructing hardness argum ents. B ut this does not im pugn the f o r m  o f the 
argum ent; argum ents can be unsound  bu t valid, and  for all I have said so far, 
there could be other argum ents o f this form  that w ere both  sound and valid. 
H ow ever, I am  going to argue that hardness argum ents, in  the form  that 
H arm an gives them , are no t valid  after all.
To see w hy they are not, consider an objection that m ight be m ade to m y earlier 
treatm ent o f H arm an’s hardness argum ents. It m ight be objected that m y 
treatm ent o f those argum ent w as inconsistent. A gainst H arm an’s claim  that 
using degrees o f b e lie f w as hard  in  principle, I argued that there m ight be 
com putationally  tractable algorithm s that w ere close enough to those H arm an 
had  in  m ind to serve as a reasonable approxim ation to them . B ut against his 
p roposed  replacem ent o f Foundations Theory by C oherence Theory, I argued 
that algorithm s that check the coherence o f a graph are likely  to be 
com putationally  intractable. B ut couldn’t there be approxim ations to those 
algorithm s that aren’t in tractable?
Lacking a definition o f coherence, i t’s d ifficult to be certain; and as I rem arked, 
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approxim ations.25 B ut the issue can be sidestepped, because the objection that 
there m ight be  an approxim ation to an algorithm  that checks for coherence is 
not one that som eone w ho has em barked  on H arm an’s p ro ject is in  a position to 
m ake. L et C  be an algorithm  that checks for coherence: som ething is coherent 
if f  (or, to the degree that) C  says it is. Suppose that it is claim ed that C  is too 
hard, bu t som e approxim ating algorithm  A  exists that is not. P resum ably, for 
som e inputs, A  produces outputs that diverge from  those produced  by  C. D efine 
’shm oherence’ to be the p roperty  checked for by A , the algorithm  otherw ise 
characterized  as approxim ating coherence: som ething is shm oherent if f  (or, to 
the degree that) A  says it is. R ecall that H arm an attem pted to argue that a 
Foundations Theory  algorithm  w ould  be  too hard; an approxim ating algorithm  
(w hich checks for coherence) should  therefore be used  instead. H arm an takes 
this to be  an argum ent for C oherence Theory  and against Foundations Theory. 
N ow  w e’ve argued that an algorithm  C  that checks for coherence is too hard.
A n approxim ating algorithm , A , is p roposed  instead. B ut A  checks for 
shm oherence. B y parity  o f reasoning, this should be an argum ent for 
Shm oherence Theory, and against C oherence T heory .26 In short, defending the 
view  that C oherence Theory  is acceptable because there are tractable 
approxim ations to the too-hard  algorithm s it involves is not an open option for 
H arm an.
W hy not? H ardness argum ents involve w hat w e can th ink  o f as a ru le  o f 
inference, w hich I w ill call th e  h a r d n e s s  r u le : i f  a m ethod o f b e lie f rev ision  is 
too hard, then it is rational to adopt an easier alternative to it. (Not, o f course, 
a n y  easier alternative; rationality  dem ands som ething like adopting the b e s t  o f 
the sufficiently  easy alternatives.) In  this w ay, a m ethod o f be lie f revision 
w hich  H arm an concedes to be  second-best27 can be excused  on the basis o f  our 
com putational lim itations, and thereafter incorporated  in to  a norm ative theory 
o f rationality .
H arm an’s applications o f the hardness ru le  have the fo llow ing form . A  problem  
P 1 is specified w ith a greater or lesser degree o f form ality; solving this problem
in appropriate circum stances has been  taken to a requ irem ent o f rationality . 
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foundational be lie f revision.) A  com putational m odel M j  that allow s P j  to be
solved is im plicitly  or explicitly  associated w ith it. (The default m odel seem s to 
be  som ething like an infin itely  fast Turing m achine.) M j  is re jected  as being
too idealized; closer consideration o f p roblem  solvers' capabilities is used  to 
produce a new  com putational m odel M 2 o f greater descrip tive accuracy. It is
argued that P j  cannot be solved by  M 2 . F inally, the requ irem ent that P j  be
solved is rejected, and P j  is rep laced  by an alternative p roblem  P 2 . P 2 is
form ulated  w ith  an eye on both  P j  and M 2 ; in  the instances w e have before us,
solutions to P 2 can be construed as approxim ate solutions to P j  that are feasible
for M 2 . (For exam ple, foundational b e lie f rev ision  is re jected  on the grounds
that a m ore descrip tively  accurate m odel o f hum an capabilities, one that takes 
in to  account their sm all fin ite  m em ories, show s that people cannot be expected 
to perform  foundational b e lie f revision. C oherence-based b e lie f revision is 
proposed  (m istakenly, I argued in  section 2) as a feasible alternative.) This is 
w hat applying the hardness ru le  consists in .28
N ow  a ru le  o f in ference is v a l id  i f  its application to true prem ises a lw a y s  
produces a true conclusion. It follow s that the hardness ru le  is not valid  as it 
stands. For, I w ill now  argue, uniform ly  applying the hardness ru le  w ould  have 
the consequence that w h a te v e r  one did  w ould  be rational; and this is absurd. 
The argum ent w ill expose tw o underly ing problem s. T he first is that o f the 
em ptiness o f the fo rm al notion of a com putational m odel, due to w hich uniform  
application of the hardness ru le  w ould  prevent ascriptions o f rationality  from  
playing certain  characteristic explanatory  roles. T he second, and perhaps the 
m ore interesting, is that un iform  application o f the hardness ru le  w ould  prevent 
the theorist from  distinguishing betw een descrip tive and norm ative accounts of 
thought; bu t this d istinction is essential to som ething 's being a theory  of 
rationality  at all, and, m oreover, is accordingly  presupposed by the hardness 
ru le itself.
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respect to g iven goals and inform ation), it is possib le to apply the hardness 
rule, and thereby to construe the optim al choice (or, for that m atter, a n y  m ore 
optim al choice) as having been too hard  for the agent. Specifically , it is alw ays 
possib le in  princip le  to produce a com putational m odel o f the agent that has 
tw o features: it has greater descrip tive accuracy than the background m odel that 
allow s the agent to m ake the optim al choice; and the m odel holds that it is not 
possib le for the agent to m ake the optim al choice.
A n exam ple m ay m ake the po in t clearer. Suppose that John has a m ath block, 
and  doesn’t th ink  clearly  w hen hungry  or flustered; for these reasons, he fails 
his m athem atics final. In principle, researchers could  produce a com putational 
m odel o f John that reconstructed  these shortcom ings. O f course, w e are far 
from  being able to actually  produce such com plex and detailed  m odels. Today, 
the k ind  o f considerations H arm an adduces, such as restrictions on m em ory 
size and on the w ays m em ory can be  accessed, are fairly  close to state-of-the- 
art. B ut the po in t is that such m odels are available in  principle. O ur 
hypothetical m odel o f John w ould  have greater descrip tive accuracy than a 
sim ilar m odel that m erely reflected  general features o f hum an psychology and 
general hum an capabilities. B ut this com putational m odel explains w hy John 
could  not solve the problem s on his m athem atics final. (If the m odel w ere 
definite enough to be turned  in to  a com puter program , the progam  w ould  fail to 
solve the problem s on John’s exam .) A pplying the hardness rule, w e conclude 
that the m athem atics final w as too hard  for him . So far, so good; if  he failed, 
m aybe the exam  w a s  too hard  for him . B ut the hardness ru le  is used  to  license 
the conclusion that the procedures that John used  to produce his m istaken 
answ ers w ere r a t io n a l  (for him ). This is, to pu t it m ildly, an unintu itive 
conclusion.
T he difficulty  is m ore system atic than an occasional v iolation of our intuitions. 
N oth ing  in  the exam ple turned  on the particu lar nature o f Jo h n ’s failings; the 
po in t w as that w h a te v e r  the reasons for his m aking a suboptim al choice, these 
could  be m odeled  com putationally . (W e can identify  the reason  for this as the 
em ptiness o f the m erely  form al notion of a com putational m odel: a 
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that specifies its transitions from  one state to another.) T he consequence o f this 
is that applying the hardness ru le  uniform ly  w ould have the resu lt that w h a te v e r  
anybody actually  d id  w ould  be rational. This is another unin tu itive conclusion; 
and again, the difficulty  is m ore system atic than its m erely  being unintuitive.
First, g iving up the d istinction betw een w hat the agent w ould  have been 
rational to  do, and w hat the agent actually  did, w ould  prevent ascriptions o f 
rationality  from  playing a characteristic explanatory  role. For exam ple, it w ould 
render unin tellig ib le actions taken to im prove rationality  (such as m ental 
exercises, taking classes in  gam e theory, eating fish because it's 'brain food', 
and so on): i f  w hatever one does is a lr e a d y  rational (since any suboptim ality  
m ust be due to som e com putational deficit), how  can any action be taken to 
render one m o r e  rational? T aken to a further extrem e, w e w ill be unable to say 
that w e are m ore rational than, say, clam s; and this is som ething w e w ant to be 
able to say in  order to be able to provide the  k ind  o f explanations w e m ight 
w ant to  give in  the  context o f evolu tionary  biology: a particu lar tra it (say, 
having a b igger brain) m ay be adaptive because it enables organism s that have 
it to be  m ore rational.
Second, theories o f rationality  requ ire  a distinction betw een  norm ative and 
descriptive, if  they are to be considered  theories o f rationality  at all. This 
appeal to the critical or norm ative aspect o f  rationality  is in trinsic to H arm an's 
hardness argum ents, w hich  purport to tell us w hat w e s h o u ld  or m a y  rationally  
do. T he appeal is unansw ered  if  the response to it is: anything.29
N ow  the w ay I have presented  the p roblem  m ay give the appearance o f a 
slippery slope argum ent. I characterized  applying the hardness ru le  as 
involv ing  the rejection  o f a com paratively  idealized  m odel o f hum an reasoning 
in  favor o f one that m ore adequately  reflects the capacities and circum stances 
o f actual persons. B ut after any m ove from  one level o f idealization  to a 
second, lesser level, one can ask: w hy stop here? H aving reflected  in  a 
com putational m odel the fact, say, that hum ans have sm all fin ite m em ories, 
w hy not, w hen considering a particu lar individual, m odel the peculiarities o f 
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elim inate idealization  after idealization  until descrip tive accuracy is reached: in 
fact, as it stands, it invites us to do precisely  that.
A rgum ents that turn  in to  slippery slopes aren’t v a lid .  That doesn’t m ean they 
shouldn’t be used. ’R em oving one hair from  a head  that is no t bald  w ill not 
m ake the head  ba ld ’ is a basis for invalid  argum ents. B ut it is nonetheless a 
reasonable rule o f thum b, w hen applied  w ith  caution.
W hat m ust be  requ ired  o f an argum ent that leads onto a slippery slope? Since 
the hardness ru le  can only be applied  som e o f the tim e, w e should, in  order to 
preven t its m isapplication, be  able to say w h e n  it is appropriately  applied, and 
w hen not: if  w e cannot, w e w ill not know  w hether a conclusion resulting from  
a particu lar application o f the ru le  is correct. W e m ust have som e clear idea of 
w hat considerations w ould  prom pt us to get o ff the slope; and w here (roughly 
w here, if  the key concept is vague) w e should  get o ff because w e have slid too 
far. M oreover, being able to say w hen the ru le is applicable is a test o f  our 
understanding  o f the considerations that underw rite  the rule. I f  w e cannot say 
(roughly) w hen the  ru le  is applicable, w e m ay presum e that w e do not really  
understand  the reasons for having such a ru le  at all.
4
I have argued that because hardness argum ents turn  into slippery slopes, using 
a hardness argum ent requires that one should know  how  to  get o ff the slope. 
T hat is, one m ust know  (roughly) w hen ’h ard ’ is ’too h ard ’ -- and w hy. In this 
section, I w ill briefly  discuss the  k ind  o f considerations to  w hich  one can 
appeal, w ith an eye to  show ing that they cannot sim ply be taken for granted.
In ordinary usage, ’too hard ’ prom pts the question, ’too hard  for w hat?’ O ur 
judgm ents o f hardness invoke our interests and concerns. C onsider, for 
exam ple, a h igh school senior w ho is assigned a particu larly  d ifficult problem  
in  his tex tbook  (norm ally used  in  college classes) by  m istake. H e fails to solve 
the problem , but is excused: the  problem , the teacher acknow ledges, w as too 
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T he sum m er passes, and the sam e student is now  a college freshm an. Three 
m onths have m ade no appreciable difference in  his talents; for the purposes o f 
the exam ple, w e shall assum e that he is as sim ilar to his earlier self as you like. 
O nce again, he is assigned the problem , and once again he fails to solve it. This 
tim e, how ever, he  is not excused on the basis o f the p rob lem ’s being too hard. 
W hen  he  com plains, his teacher tells h im  that he could have done it i f  he had  
begun studying earlier, i f  he had  gotten a tutor, i f  he had  tried  harder, if  he had  
thought m ore carefully  about it. T he very sam e p rob lem  is at one tim e too hard, 
at another tim e not too hard  -- all w ithout any change in  the cognitive 
capacities o f the problem -solver.
T here is, o f course, one clear sense in  w hich  the p roblem  w as too hard  in  both  
cases: the student failed  to solve it bo th  tim es. B ut this is evidently  no t the 
relevan t sense o f ’too hard ’, since, as exam ples like this one show, w e support 
judgm ents o f hardness by appealing to counterfactuals: ’H e could have done it 
i f  only he had... ’; ’H e couldn’t have done it even if ...’ N ow  notice a n y  task  is 
such that there is s o m e  contrary-to-fact assum ption on w hich  it could  have been 
done. (H e c o u ld  have solved the p roblem  if  a fu turistic brain  operation had  
m ade h im  m uch sm arter, or if  he  had  applied  h im self to m athem atics for the 
last ten years, or i f  a m iracle had  happened .30 ) W hat picks out the relevant 
counterfactuals, and the reference classes (high school seniors, freshm en) 
associated  w ith them ? In this case, the answ er is clear: the expectations o f the 
instructor, as shaped by his institu tional ro le .31
Evidently , saying how  one gets o ff the slippery slope generated  by  hardness 
argum ents is in  part a m atter o f m aking explicit the concerns and in terests that 
underw rite  particu lar judgm ents that som ething is too hard; this is w hat one 
needs to be clear about if  one is deploy the form  o f argum ent. N ow  I do not 
w ish to take a stand on w hether H arm an does in  fact have a clear understanding 
o f the concerns and in terests that underw rite  his hardness argum ents. B ut he 
fails, in  any case, to m ake them  explicit. H e does not articulate the background 
concerns that m otivate his choices o f com putational m odel, and he does not 
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w e cannot expect to be able to assess a hardness argum ent if  such central 
considerations are suppressed. T he om ission is an exam ple o f a further p itfall 
associated  w ith hardness argum ents -- the tem ptation to take for granted the 
considerations that determ ine w hen ’h ard ’ is ’too h ard ’.
N ow  it m ight be thought that w hen r a t io n a l i ty  is at issue, the background of 
in terests and concerns c a n  be taken for granted. As I have had  it pu t to m e, if  a 
procedure is too hard  for the hum an organism  as such, it can’t be w hat 
rationality  dem ands. A nd  I grant that there is som ething very  plausible- 
sounding about the claim . B ut even i f  it is true, it is still not evident w h y  it is 
true. A nd, I w ill suggest, there are reasons to th ink  that ’too hard  for the hum an 
organism  as such’ is not the p lace to get o ff the slippery slope.32
It is no t at all clear to m e w hy our rationality-re la ted  interests should follow  
species lines. There are, first o f  all, species-w ide cognitive failures that w e 
w ould  not w ant to w rite in to  rationality .33 T here ev idently  a r e  procedures that 
are too hard  for the hum an organism  that w e d o  insist are dem anded by 
rationality . Second, at the risk  o f entering the realm  o f science-fiction, w e m ay 
im agine a society in  w hich  hum ans m ingle w ith  other species, som e w ith  
som ew hat greater and som e w ith som ew hat lesser cognitive abilities. Is it at all 
obvious that in  such a society the abilities o f the hum an organism  (or o f any 
particu lar k in d  o f organism ) w ould  p resen t them selves as the standard for 
evaluating the dem ands o f rationality?
It m ight be  thought that ’ought im plies can’, and that it follow s from  this dictum  
that if  hum an beings can’t perform  a particu lar task, then rationality  cannot 
insist that they ought to perform  it. Indeed, I am  inclined  to th ink  that this w hy 
the capabilities o f the hum an organism  seem  like a p lausib le p lace to get o ff the 
slope. A fter all, there’s nobody here bu t us hum ans, and if  hum ans can’t do, 
then no one can do it. A nd  i f  no one c a n  do it, then no one o u g h t  to do it. B ut 
rationality  is a norm ative concept; that is, i f  i t’s rational to do, you ought to do 
it. So i f  you oughtn’t to do it, then it can’t be rational to do.
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there are nonetheless tasks that a particu lar ind iv idual is unable to perform  such 
that this failure supports the accusation o f irrationality . W hy does 'ought' im ply  
'can' at the level o f the species, bu t no t at the level o f the indiv idual? In  any 
case, the application o f the dictum  is unclear. If  I know  that I cannot succeed at 
som e task, then perhaps it is irrational for m e to t r y  to do it. B ut it does not 
fo llow  from  this that I am  rational if  I do not perform  the task. (For exam ple, if  
I know  I cannot th ink  clearly, then it is pointless for m e to try. B ut it does not 
fo llow  that I can be rational even if  I do no t th ink  clearly.) N o t all 
perform ances are tryings.
I do no t th ink  that I have presented  a knockdow n argum ent against the claim  
that the abilities o f the hum an organism  m ark  the  poin t at w hich to get o ff the 
slippery slope. B ut the burden  o f p ro o f is squarely on the shoulders o f this 
position 's proponent. If  the line is to be draw n here, w e m ust be given som e 
reason  to th ink  that here is w here it is to be draw n; and such reason  is 
conspicuously  absent. B ecause I th ink  that judgm ents about w hat cognitive 
processes are too hard  to be dem anded by  rationality  are continuous w ith  other 
judgm ents about w hat is too hard, I m yself am  inclined  to the view  that the  line 
is draw n in  no particu lar place, because there is no one line. D ifferent lines are 
draw n in  d ifferent places on different occasions, and consequently  each 
hardness argum ent ow es its audience an explicit accounting o f the  in terests and 
concerns that give the judgm ents o f hardness their content, and, w hen hardness 
argum ents are being used  to develop a theory  o f rational cognition, a further 
explanation  o f how  these judgm ents are relevant to the theory  o f rationality  
being advanced. As w e have seen, the first o f these dem ands has not been  m et; 
and  as w e w ill see in  the next section, there is reason  to  th ink  that the second 
w ill not be.
5
B eyond the im m ediate  questions about the  soundness and valid ity  o f hardness 
argum ents there  is a deeper issue, that o f the in tellig ib ility  o f their deploym ent 
to address questions o f rationality . T he problem  can be raised  in  the follow ing 
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w hen this question  is construed  as ’H ow  can I m ost adequately  solve (given) 
problem s w ith  m y lim ited  com putational resources?’ B ut the question ’H ow  can 
I best deploy m y lim ited  com putational resources?’ seem s to p resuppose that 
m y com putational resources are som ething distinct from  m yself, som ething I 
ow n and use the w ay I m ight ow n and use a com puter. T he p icture it evokes is 
one in  w hich I am  standing b e h in d  m y m ind, as it w ere; one in  w hich m y m ind 
is e x te r n a l  to m e.34 B ut o f course I am  not d istinct from  the com putational 
resources w e are considering. I am  not som ehow  standing behind  m y m ind, 
operating it the w ay I m ight operate a com puter. Indeed, on the view  I take to 
be H arm an’s, I a m  ju s t the aggregate o f those com putational resources; that is 
w hy H arm an finds hardness argum ents p lausib le in  the first place.
W hence this pecu liar im age? To answ er this question, w e should consider 
w here hardness argum ents com e from  in  the first place. Philosophers 
occasionally  em bark  on expeditions beyond the borders o f philosophy 
departm ents; hardness argum ents w ere first b rought back  from  a foray in to  the 
neighboring d iscip line o f com puter science, w here the practical need  to build  
w orking m achines and w rite w orking code m ade com putational com plexity  an 
issue. In  this dom ain, hardness considerations are used  to ju stify  design and 
im plem entation  decisions. A n engineer is faced  w ith  the p roblem  o f designing 
a device to perform  a given task. W e m ust im agine the designer beginning w ith 
a specification o f the perform ance o f his id e a l  device, the device as he  w ould  
like it to w ork. (W e m ay suppose this specification to take the form  o f a 
function  from  the dev ice’s inputs to its outputs.) B ecause o f the lim itations o f 
the m aterial w ith  w hich  he has to w ork  (or for econom ic reasons, or w hatever), 
the engineer m ay decide to cut corners; and here hardness considerations m ay 
p lay  a decisive role. For exam ple, given that he cannot bu ild  an infin itely  fast 
device, the com putational com plexity  o f the task  the device is to perform  m ay 
m andate using a fast and dirty heuristic  instead  o f inplem enting  the algorithm  
that the engineer has determ ined is too hard. T hat is, the engineer m ay choose 
to construct a device that, for som e acceptably  sm all range o f inputs, produces 
incorrect outputs. W hat counts as too hard, and w hat counts as an acceptable 
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N ow  in  such circum stances, w e m ay assess the eng ineer’s decision as rational 
or irrational. B ut w e do not assess the d e v ic e  as being rational or irrational: the 
term  o f approbation, "ra tional”, sticks to the engineer and not to his creation. 
M oreover, the deviations from  the ideal specification that the engineer is 
rational to to lerate rem ain  errors. They do not cease to be errors because they 
resu lted  from  a rational design decision, precisely  because the design decision 
w as a decision to to lerate those errors. H ardness argum ents, in  short, 
underw rite  ascriptions o f rationality  to engineers, no t the devices they 
construct.
C onsider now  H arm an’s attem pted adaptations o f hardness argum ents to 
underw rite  ascriptions o f rationality  to hum an beings. It is the hum an beings 
w ho are taking the com putational shortcuts, so w e are to th ink  o f hum an beings 
as the ’dev ices.’ B ut w e saw that hardness argum ents do not w arrant ascriptions 
o f rationality  to the devices. A re hum ans also thought to be  occupying the role 
o f engineer? There m ay be cases for w hich this is a not unreasonable construal; 
choosing the w ay in  w hich  one w ill solve a d ivision problem  (long or short 
division), or choosing w hat habits one w ill attem pt to acquire com e to m ind. 
B ut the hardness argum ents H arm an presents do not address cases o f this kind. 
I do no t c h o o s e  w hether or not to use probabilities in  adjusting m y beliefs 
(except in  special cases); and I do no t c h o o s e  w hether to keep track  o f the 
evidence for m y beliefs and engage in  foundational b e lie f revision (again, 
except in  special cases).35 T he cognitive processes in  question  are bu ilt in, 
h a r d w ir e d ;  w hen w e em ploy this algorithm  as opposed to that, that is ju s t the 
w ay w e d o  do it.
W e are not in  these respects our ow n engineers. It follow s that hardness 
argum ents do not in  any straightforw ard w ay m ake the term  o f approbation 
"ra tional” stick  to us. If  G od designed us, perhaps hardness argum ents can 
m ake the w ord  stick  to him ; if  no one designed us, then perhaps hardness 
argum ents m ake the w ord  stick  to nobody. H ardness argum ents allow  one to 
conclude that this or that choice is rational f o r  th e  d e s ig n e r ; they w arran t no 
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In deploying hardness considerations, it is im portan t not to slip in to  im agining 
that one is, as it w ere, one's ow n designer; one m ay then  conflate the rationality  
o f  the design decision w ith  one's ow n rationality . 'If I w ere M other N ature, I 
w ould have been  rational to design m yself to  m ake these m istakes; therefore, I 
am  rational, and they aren 't really  m istakes' is confused  reasoning.
6
I am  inclined  to th ink  that there is som ething im portan tly  righ t about hardness 
argum ents. The philosophical tradition  from  w hich  H arm an is, com m endably, 
departing is one that understands rationality  in  a w ay that has only the  m ost 
attenuated  connection to hum an capabilities and practices. Surely it is 
som ehow  an im portan t aspect o f rationality  that one's m ethods o f reasoning  and 
cognitive resources roughly  m atch.
N onetheless, hardness argum ents are extrem ely hard  to get right. Partly  this is 
because it is hard  to get their prem ises right. B ut partly  it is because the 
argum ent form  itse lf  is not valid, and can accordingly  not be deployed w ithout 
appealing directly  to the considerations that underw rite  it. These considerations 
are poorly  understood, and the m atter is not helped  by the tendency to treat 
hardness argum ents d irected tow ards w hat is and is not rational as o f a p iece 
w ith the design and im plem entation  decisions m ade by com puter scientists; 
eliding the  differences betw een the tw o produces a confidence regarding the 
form er that is entirely  unw arranted.
Notes
*I'm grateful to Alyssa Bernstein, Gary Ebbs, Oren Etzioni, David Finkelstein, Sally 
Goldman, Robert Nozick, Tim Scanlon, Ed Stein, Candace Vogler and especially Philip 
Klein for reading drafts and for valuable discussion. The paper's greatest debt is of course to 
Gilbert Harman, whose stimulating work occasioned it; I hope that the critical tone it adopts 
will not obscure the sheer fun I had reading Change in View .[back]
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2. For example, Cherniak, 1986, is an extended instance of argument of this kind. See also 
Stich, 1990, pp. 28, 151-58, and Goldman, 1986, esp. ch. 6. Arguments of this kind have a 
longer tenure in the economics literature; cf., e.g., Simon, 1979. [back]
3. Other hardness arguments may be implicit in Harman’s discussion of the Principle of 
Clutter Avoidance and the Logical Inconsistency Principle (pp. 12-15), and the reasoning 
supporting his claim that "[t]here are practical reasons to minimize change in one’s view” (p. 
63). Such considerations are explicit in his discussion of ’holism’ in practical reasoning (pp. 
98ff; cf. esp. pp. 101, 105-107, 112). But of these, only the ’holism’ argument receives 
reasonably full treatment, and its main point (insofar as it is a hardness argument) is merely 
an application of the conclusion of one of the two arguments I will discuss. [back]
4. ’Reasonable’ is being left an imprecisely defined notion for the present; possibly it varies 
from person to person and situation to situation. (More on this in sections 3 and 4.) [back]
5. In particular cases, this may need qualification. There are cases where it’s rational to use 
NP-hard algorithms, for example, when they are suitable for the range of cases one is 
actually liable to encounter. (Cherniak, 1986, p. 93, presents the simplex algorithm as an 
illustration of this point, though here it is, importantly, not simply the size  of the input that is 
the problem.) For an accessible introduction to this material, see Garey and Johnson, 1979. 
[back]
6. Pp. 25-27; cf. also p. 115. He excepts "a few special cases of beliefs that are explicitly 
beliefs about probabilities" (p. 22). [back]
7. The equation is
where P(A) is the new probability of A , p(A) is the old probability of A , and the C i are all
possible conjunctions formed from the n propositions making up one’s beliefs and their 
negations; there will be 2n such conjunctions. (Jeffrey, 1983, pp. 172f; I have slightly 
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8. It’s suggestive that Jeffrey’s illustration of the technique (1983, p. 173) in fact requires not 
2n (=8) atoms but only n (=3). [back]
9. Another is the maximum entropy distribution approach. Maximum entropy distributions 
can be stored in space that is linear in the number of constraints, as opposed to the 
exponential space generally required by probability distributions (Goldman, 1987, pp. 14f). 
Goldman provides a technique for computing maximum entropy distributions that is efficient 
when the hypergraph that models the variables and constraints is not too connected (p. 32). 
Cf. also Goldman and Rivest, 1988. rback]
10. A graph  is a set of nodes (or vertices), and a set of edges (or arcs), each of which is a 
pair of nodes. Figures (1) and (2) are representations of graphs: the dots represent nodes, and 
the lines between the dots represent edges. A directed  graph  can be thought of as having 
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Figure 2
Merely associative dependencies can be represented using Markov networks, which are 
undirected graphs. For further treatment of Bayesian and Markov networks, see Pearl, 1988. 
Tbackl
11. Cf. Cooper, forthcoming. [back!
12. This is, of course, only an example; it is unlikely that most interesting systems of belief 
can be represented by singly-connected graphs. Techniques exploiting other features of 
graphs will be required in realistic cases. For other recent work in the field, see Beinlich et 
al., 1989; Chavez, 1989; Chavez and Cooper, 1989a; Chavez and Cooper, 1989b; Lauritzen 
and Spiegelhalter, 1988. [back]
13. Employing these algorithms may still be hard in practice, even if not hard in principle; 
we have seen no argument on this score, one way or the other. But Harman's argument 
proceeds from the claim that belief revision using probabilities is hard in principle, not from 
the claim that it is hard in practice.
Recall that hardness in practice is sensitive to what resources one actually has available. So 
evidence that Bayesian inference engines can actually be constructed (see, e.g., Agogino et 
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14. Harman distinguishes the views he calls by those names from conventionally so-called 
foundationalism and coherence theory, but the resemblances will be evident to readers 
familiar with the traditional positions. [back]
15. Harman acknowledges this on p. 42; cf. also p. 10. [back]
16. Truth Maintenance Systems (TMSs) typically do this. See, e.g., Doyle, 1981. [back]
17. This procedure doesn’t address the question of whether the belief is still supportable, i.e., 
if it could  be inferred from other beliefs you have. It just checks whether you have 
performed an inference (rehearsed a justification) that still supports it. But the foundational 
procedure Harman suggests doesn’t address this question either (pp. 30f). [back]
18. Just in passing: Harman’s claim that coherence includes consistency suggests that one 
must check one’s beliefs for consistency; in the truth-functional case, this is SAT, the 
original NP-complete problem. We may presume that checking the consistency of actual 
systems of belief, which are not merely truth-functional arrangements of atomic 
propositions, would be harder. So if coherence includes consistency, coherentist belief 
revision is almost certainly hard in principle. [back]
19. We may remark on what seems to be another assumption of Harman’s: that Coherence 
Theory and Foundations Theory jointly exhaust the range of options regarding belief 
revision. This assumption is necessary for his inference from the hardness of foundationalist 
belief revision to the acceptability of coherentist belief revision. Now sometimes 
philosophers write as though foundationalism and coherentism were the only two 
epistemological options. But the two theories would logically  exhaust the field of 
possibilities only if one were simply the complement of the other: if the sole content of 
Coherence Theory, for instance, were that Foundations Theory was wrong. If that were the 
appropriate understanding of Coherence Theory, however, hardness arguments would not 
work, if only because Coherence Theory would not then provide a m ethod of belief revision: 
If Foundations Theory dictates use of method Mf, Coherence Theory would say no more than
"Don’t use Mf'; but "Don’t use Mf' is not a method of belief revision. Now if Coherence
Theory is not the logical complement of Foundations Theory, a hardness argument for 
Coherence Theory proceeding from the premise that Foundations Theory is too hard cannot 
exclude a p rio ri the possibility that some third theory is to be preferred. So substantive 
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such argument; what I wish to emphasize for future reference is the degree to which such 
argument would complicate the deployment of a comparative hardness argument. (Because 
the subject of this paper is hardness arguments, and not methods of belief revision, I will not 
here consider what plausible alternatives to Foundations Theory and Coherence Theory 
might look like.)
Moreover, for hardness arguments of this kind to work, two further premises must be 
available. The first is comparative, of the form M 1 is harder than M2'; the second, to the
effect that ’M 2 is not too hard’. Arguing that the method dictated by one of two theories is too
hard does not by itself settle the question in favor of the second method; it may be too hard 
as well. (There is no a p riori guarantee that any method is acceptable: it may be that some 
problems we face cannot be adequately handled by any technique.) [back]
20. Cf., e.g., pp. 30, 32. Harman discusses how to estimate the sizes of proposed 
modifications at pp. 59ff. [back]
21. We can also accommodate Harman’s claim that "some explanatory connections are 
immediate, whereas others are indirect" (p. 66), in this way: one beliefs immediately 
explaining another can be represented in the graph by connecting the nodes that represent 
those beliefs by an edge. [back]
22. Problems which are #P-hard are thought to be harder than those that are merely NP-hard. 
For a discussion of #P  and a survey of some problems in it, see Valiant, 1979. [back]
23. I will review a few more possibilities to give some of the flavor of the problem. A large 
number of paths between nodes might be suggested by remarks Harman makes on p. 67; this 
is computationally tractable, but allows graphs like that in figure 2 : there are many paths 
between A and B , but the graph represented in figure 1 does not seem to be a representation 
of a highly coherent system of beliefs. (High connectivity -- requiring a high number of 
internally node-disjoint paths between any two nodes, instead of requiring a large number of 
possibly overlapping paths -- would rule out the counterexample in figure 2. But 
connectivity as usually defined is insufficiently robust: on the standard definition, a very 
coherent graph (one with high connectivity) could be reduced to very low connectivity (1 ), 
just by adding a ’tail’ (a node connected by only one edge), but the addition of a single belief 
that this represents surely does not so drastically reduce the coherence of a system of beliefs. 
And even if this problem is somehow circumvented, the disjointness requirement means that 
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does not adequately reflect the notion of coherence we are trying to capture. Finally, the 
strength of the connections is not taken into account; when this is done, the problem turns 
into Network Reliability.)
Alternatively, one could try to minimize distance between pairs of nodes. This is not hard in 
principle: it can be done in, at worst, O(n3). But this would end up classifying graphs like the 
one in figure 1 as very coherent (no two nodes in it are more than two arcs apart); and this is 
not what we mean by coherence. (While I will not try to specify just what it is about these 
graphs that makes it seem implausible that they represent highly coherent systems of belief, 
it is curious that both seem to contain bottlenecks.)
Yet another possibility might be to try to capture the notion of relative coherence in terms of 
minimum covering by cliques. A clique is a set of nodes such that each is connected to every 
other. A graph is covered by a set of cliques if every edge is in a clique in that set. In looking 
for a property that would characterize coherent systems of beliefs, one might notice that they 
are typically made up of large groups of beliefs whose members are very tightly related to 
each other, while the groups of beliefs themselves are more loosely related. Comparing two 
graphs to see which of them more closely matches this pattern would involve finding a graph- 
theoretic property to express it. Cliques look promising; the fewer of them it takes to cover 
the graph, the better. Unfortunately, the problem of covering a graph with the smallest 
possible number of cliques is hard in principle: it is NP-complete (Garey and Johnson, 1979, 
p. 194). Of course, not all beliefs in these tightly related groups need be 'immediately 
adjacent' to each other. To deal with this, one can extend the notion of covering a graph with 
cliques to that of covering it with subgraphs of low diameter. The diameter of a subgraph is 
the worst shortest-path distance between any two nodes in it. So, for example, a subgraph of 
diameter 2 contains nodes each of which can be reached from any other in two steps. It is 
easy to reduce covering by cliques to this problem, which is thereby shown to be hard as 
well.
What this very brief survey of candidates suggests is that they fall into two categories: the 
computationally tractable candidates, which are not even remotely what we mean when we 
talk about the coherence of systems of beliefs, and the candidates which are on the way to 
capturing (even if they do not entirely capture) what we mean by coherence, but which are 
computationally intractable. [back]
24. It might be suggested that we should be trying to increase local (rather than global) 
coherence. (For pressing this point, I'm grateful to Gary Ebbs and Ed Stein.) Since the 
subject of the present paper is hardness arguments rather than coherence theory, I will refrain 
from assessing this possibility in detail; we can remark in passing that there will be
U lN S T IT IIT tO K A L  REPOSITORY 
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difficulties in making out the relevant notion of locality, and problems with motivating the 
view: why should one want to increase specifically local coherence? For present purposes, it 
suffices that this is not Harman’s view: "Whether... a belief is justified depends on how well 
it fits together with everything else one believes" (pp. 32f, my emphasis). [back]
25. I suggested a moment ago that coherence almost certainly involves Network Reliability, 
and to the best of my knowledge, no one has figured out a way to approximate it. But that 
doesn’t mean that there’s any guarantee that someone can’t come along with an 
approximation tomorrow. Nevertheless, the proof of the pudding is very much in the eating: 
it’s unclear how seriously we have to take an objection that runs, there m ight be an 
approximating algorithm -- but does not actually propose any such thing. [back]
26. A move structurally similar to this one is in fact made by Harman, for his Principle of 
Positive Undermining and against the Principle of Negative Undermining; foundationalists 
take the former to be an approximation to the latter. Cf. pp. 39f. [back]
27. Harman presents Coherence Theory as an approximation to Foundations Theory. If one 
had unlimited computational resources, it would always be right to behave in accordance 
with the dictates of Foundations Theory; but because our resources are limited, we must get 
by with mere coherence. "If one had unlimited powers of record keeping and an unlimited 
ability to survey ever more complex structures of argument, replies, rebuttals, and so on, it 
would be rational always to accept things only tentatively as working hypotheses, never 
ending inquiry" (p. 50). But, "something like the foundations theory applies to what one 
tentatively accepts as a working hypothesis" (p. 49). (For further textual indications that this 
is in fact Harman’s view, see his description of "extensive use of probabilities" as "too 
complicated for mere finite beings" (p. 27), the implication being that other beings might do 
better to rely on probabilities; his remark that "[b]ecause of one’s finite and limited powers, 
[53] one cannot escape the first three commitments except in a few instances when one is 
able tentatively to accept certain propositions merely as working hypotheses" (p. 52f); and 
the attribution of the necessity of Clutter Avoidance to "the limitations of finiteness" (p. 56).) 
[back]
28. It might be suggested that a precise formulation of the hardness rule is in order here. But 
I will forego producing one, for two reasons. First, as we will see, it’s not necessary for the 
argument. Second, an artificial precision would involve picking a specific version of the 
view I’m attributing to Harman -- an unnecessary exegetical risk, and one that would tend to 
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29. In Change in V iew  this difficulty remains in the background. First, Harman does not 
apply the hardness rule everywhere one might; consequently, the question of what would 
happen if it were applied everywhere can be overlooked. Second, Harman is unenthusiastic 
about distinguishing descriptive from normative theories of rationality; he "find[s] it hard to 
say whether the theory [he] want[s] is a norm ative theory or a descriptive theory": the two 
kinds of theory "are intimately related... it is hard to come up with convincing normative 
principles except by considering how people actually do reason... [and] any descriptive 
theory must involve a certain amount of idealization, [which is] always normative to some 
extent" (p. 7). [back]
30. There are counterfactuals of this form even when NP-hard problems are at issue. One can 
imagine physical laws that would permit the construction of Huffman’s lamp devices; such 
devices could solve NP-hard problems rapidly. Even for an NP-complete problem, it is 
possible to produce the counterfactual: if the laws of physics had been different, he would 
have been able to do it. [back]
31. This does not mean that there is an ’institutional’ sense of ’too hard’ that is to be 
contrasted to a more central ’capabilities’ sense. Suppose I am attempting to assess a person’s 
capabilities by giving him a task which he fails to complete because a tornado sweeps 
through the town. Normally, I do not conclude that it was beyond his abilities, that it was too 
hard. Rather, I say that (perhaps) he could have done it if the tornado had not prevented him. 
This is because the task is conceived in one way rather than another: if the task had been 
conceived as an exercise in performing under extreme stress, I might have said instead that 
he couldn’t do it, that it was too hard for him. [back]
32. I have also had it suggested to me that what matters is whether a procedure is too hard 
for a rational being. But this is a red herring. One cannot determine what it is rational to do 
by determining what is too hard, if one’s determinations of what is too hard require already 
knowing what is rational. Notice also that it is unclear that the appeal to rationality to 
determine what is too hard would classify as too hard problems that are merely 
computationally difficult, since it might be said that had the agent been more rational 
(something which would have involved having greater computational abilities) he would 
have gotten the right answer. [back]
33. See Nisbet and Ross, 1980, for a depressing survey of some of these. [back]
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prompted this discussion; she calls the person so conceived an 'angel in disguise'. I'm 
grateful to her for allowing me to read a draft version of her paper "Imperfect Rationality 
and the Ghost in the Globally Maximizing Machine". fback!
35. Harman concurs: he does not "want to suggest that one ever makes conscious use of 
principles of revision... it may well be that reasoning is a relatively automatic process whose 
outcome is not under one's control" (p. 2). rback]
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